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Abstract
Unitization refers to the creation of a new unit from previously distinct items. The concept of unitization has been used to explain
how novel pairings between items can be remembered without requiring recollection, by virtue of new, item-like representations
that enable familiarity-based retrieval. We tested an alternative account of unitization – a schema account – which suggests that
associations between items can be rapidly assimilated into a schema. We used a common operationalization of Bunitization^ as
the difference between two unrelated words being linked by a definition, relative to two words being linked by a sentence, during
an initial study phase. During the following relearning phase, a studied word was re-paired with a new word, either related or
unrelated to the original associate from study. In a final test phase, memory for the relearned associations was tested. We
hypothesized that, if unitized representations act like schemas, then we would observe some generalization to related words,
such that memory would be better in the definition than sentence condition for related words, but not for unrelated words.
Contrary to the schema hypothesis, evidence favored the null hypothesis of no difference between definition and sentence
conditions for related words (Experiment 1), even when each cue was associated with multiple associates, indicating that the
associations can be generalized (Experiment 2), or when the schematic information was explicitly re-activated during Relearning
(Experiment 3). These results suggest that unitized associations do not generalize to accommodate new information, and
therefore provide evidence against the schema account.
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Introduction
Did I put my car keys on the kitchen table?What’s the name of
this person? Did I ever see my friend wearing this outfit be-
fore? To answer these questions, which can be fundamental to
our everyday lives, we need to be able to remember that two or
more items were experienced conjointly. Unitization – the
creation of a new unit from individual items – has been pro-
posed as an effective strategy for remembering such episodic
associations (e.g., Gobet et al., 2001; Graf & Schacter, 1989;
Yonelinas, 1997; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, & Soltani, 1999).
Although unitization effects on memory are well documented,
the underlying cognitive mechanisms are only sparsely inves-
tigated in the current literature. The goal of the current study
was to distinguish between two possible accounts of
unitization: a traditional Bitem account^ and an alternative
Bschema account.^ We rely on a key difference between the
two accounts – that the schema account, but not the item
account, allows generalization from one association to another
related one – and argue that if unitized associations do not
display this critical property of schemas, then the item account
of unitization remains most likely.
Memory for episodic associations can be assessed by pre-
senting two items and asking whether they were previously
presented together, a task termed Bassociative recognition.^
The widely supported dual-process theory of episodic memo-
ry posits that recognition comprises two separable processes:
familiarity and recollection. Familiarity is a feeling of having
encountered something or someone before, without retrieval
of additional information, whereas recollection further pro-
vides contextual details about that encounter. Neurocognitive
models of recognition memory claim that, while the hippo-
campus is necessary for recollection, familiarity is mainly as-
sociated with the perirhinal cortex (for review, see Yonelinas,
2002). Traditionally, it has been thought that, while recognition
of single items can be supported by either recollection or famil-
iarity, retrieval of newly learnt associations between arbitrary
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items requires recollection (e.g., Donaldson & Rugg, 1998;
Hockley & Consoli, 1999; Yonelinas, 1997). Subsequent find-
ings, however, challenged this traditional view.
Quamme, Yonelinas, and Norman (2007) showed that
amnestic patients with damage to the hippocampus and severe
recollection deficits were nonetheless able to remember
pairings of initially unrelated words following unitization. In
their study, participants were given an arbitrary word pair such
as CLOUD-LAWN in the context of either a definition (e.g.,
Ba garden used for sky-gazing^) or a sentence (e.g., Bthe
______ could be seen from the ______^). It was presumed
that the former, but not the latter, creates a new unit that allows
the two words to be encoded as a compound. The main find-
ing was that although the patients struggled to remember non-
unitized pairs, their memory for unitized pairs was relatively
intact. This study indicates that hippocampal-based recollec-
tion might not be necessary for recognition of arbitrary
pairings, and that unitization can enable familiarity-based re-
trieval on the basis of neocortical representations, for example
in perirhinal cortex (see also D’Angelo, Kacollja, Rabin,
Rosenbaum, & Ryan, 2015; Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath,
2010; Ryan, Moses, Barense, & Rosenbaum, 2013; for addi-
tional evidence from amnestic patients).
This notion was supported by a growing body of evidence
(for review, see Mecklinger & Jäger, 2009; Yonelinas, Aly,
Wang, & Koen, 2010), including intact memory for unitized
associations in healthy older adults with decreased hippocam-
pal functionality (Bastin, Diana, Simon, Collette, Yonelinas,
& Salmon, 2013; Delhaye, Tibon, Gronau, Levy, & Bastin,
2017; Delhaye & Bastin, 2016; Memel & Ryan, 2017; Troyer,
D'Souza, Vandermorris, & Murphy, 2011), behavioral studies
showing that unitization affects familiarity but not recollection
(e.g., Ahmad & Hockley, 2017; Diana, Yonelinas, &
Ranganath, 2008; Parks & Yonelinas, 2015; Robey &
Riggins, 2017; Shao, Opitz, Yang, and Weng, 2016; Tibon,
Vakil, Goldstein, & Levy, 2012; Tu, Alty, & Diana, 2017),
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies show-
ing that retrieval of unitized information produces activation
differences in regions associated with familiarity (Bader,
Opitz, Reith, & Mecklinger, 2014; Diana et al., 2010; Ford,
Verfaellie, & Giovanello, 2010; Haskins, Yonelinas,
Quamme, & Ranganath, 2008; Memel & Ryan, 2017), and
electrophysiological studies showing modulation of the well-
documented FN400 ERP effect – the putative electrophysio-
logical correlate of familiarity (reviewed by Mecklinger,
2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Wilding & Ranganath, 2011) –
following unitization encoding (e.g., Bader, Mecklinger,
Hoppstädter, & Meyer, 2010; Diana, Van den Boom,
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2011; Guillaume & Etienne, 2015;
Jäger, Mecklinger, & Kipp, 2006; Jäger, Mecklinger &
Kliegel, 2010; Kamp, Bader, & Mecklinger, 2016; Rhodes
& Donaldson, 2007; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2008; Tibon,
Ben-Zvi, & Levy, 2014; Tibon, Gronau, Scheuplein,
Mecklinger, & Levy, 2014; Zheng, Li, Xiao, Broster, Jiang,
& Xi, 2015).
The conventional account of these findings is that unitiza-
tion results in the formation of a new representation, like that
for a single item, rather than just strengthening associations
between the original two item representations. In other words,
according to this Bitem account,^ the two items become fully
integrated or Bchunked,^ so that they comprise a single unit,
which does not necessarily bear any relationship to the con-
stituent items (e.g., in the way that Bcottage pie^ has no direct
semantic relationship with Bcottage^). The core assumptions
of the aforementioned studies are that: (1) familiarity cannot
support retrieval of arbitrary episodic associations, and (2)
item memory can be supported by familiarity. Therefore, if
there is an indication of familiarity-based associative retrieval,
then it is assumed that the to-be-associated items were fused
together into a single-item representation. Nevertheless, this
logic assumes that the Bitem^ is the only cognitive construct
that can be supported by familiarity. An alternative account
would posit that unitization can generate another construct,
which is not necessarily an item, but can still be retrieved
via familiarity. One such alternative construct is a schema.
The notion of schemas in memory was introduced by
Bartlett (1932), who observed that an organized structure of
prior knowledge – a Bschema^ – can facilitate memory for
new episodic information. Such schemas are stored in seman-
tic memory and consist of chunks of knowledge about the
world that have become activated in order to guide current
processing (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Rumelhart, 1980). A recent
framework (SLIMM: Schema-Linked Interactions between
Medial prefrontal and Medial temporal lobes), which inte-
grates schema theory with recent neuroscientific data, defines
a schema as an activated network of interconnected neocorti-
cal representations (van Kesteren, Ruiter, Fernández, &
Henson, 2012). Crucially, SLIMM proposes that a schema
can support rapid acquisition of new knowledge that is con-
gruent with that schema into the neocortex, without requiring
the hippocampus. Given the evidence that unitized associa-
tions are encoded as hippocampus-independent neocortical
representations (e.g., Quamme et al., 2007), a schema account
of unitization should be considered.
A schema account would argue that rather than fusing dis-
tinct items into one unit, unitization rapidly converts arbitrary
episodic links into meaningful semantic ones, thus establish-
ing a schema. According to this, when two items (e.g., the
words BCLOUD^ and BLAWN^) are presented together and
accompanied by a semantic context that can apply to both
(e.g., Ba garden used for sky-gazing^), then even if the
word-pair does not constitute a pre-existing concept, the se-
mantic context provides a new structure that can accommo-
date both words. Critically, given that similar to item memory,
semantic links are accessible via familiarity, i.e., a feeling of
knowing (e.g., Kikyo, Ohki, &Miyashita, 2002; Tulving, 1972;
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Yonelinas, 2002), the abovementioned studies are also consis-
tent with a schema account. Furthermore, in addition to the core
finding – that unitized associations can be retrieved via famil-
iarity –which does not favor either account, other aspects of the
previous results resonate with our proposed schema account.
For example, the evidence that semantic memory remains pre-
served in amnestic patients (e.g., Vargha-Khadem, Gadian,
Watkins, Connelly, Van Paesschen, & Mishkin, 1997), and in
older age (e.g., Craik & Bosman, 1992), is consistent with the
intact unitization effect found in these populations. Moreover,
in fMRI studies, unitization was associated not only with
perirhinal cortex, but also other neocortical regions that are
believed to play a role in semantic/schema functions (e.g.,
medial prefrontal cortex, Bader et al., 2014; fusiform gyrus
and superior temporal gyrus, Haskins et al., 2008). Indeed,
when interpreting their findings of increased BOLD activation
in the medial prefrontal cortex following unitization encoding,
Bader et al. (2014) speculated that conditions that enable unit-
ization render new information congruent with pre-existing
knowledge, allowing rapid integration of that information.
This post-hoc suggestion matches our proposed schema ac-
count. Finally, it is possible that what is observed in ERP studies
of unitization is in fact a modulation of the N400 component
(e.g., Kutas and Federmeier, 2011), which has been shown
sensitive to schema congruent vs. incongruent information,
and is difficult to distinguish from the FN400 (e.g., Paller,
Voss, & Boehm, 2007).
An idea similar, but not identical, to our proposed schema
account was considered previously by Parks and Yonelinas
(2015), namely that unitization reflects semantic elaboration.
These authors argued that to the extent that unitization creates
a new unit, it should not improve recognition of the constitu-
ent items (i.e., improve associative recognition but not item
recognition). In contrast, if unitization reflects semantic elab-
oration, it should benefit both associative and item recogni-
tion. The authors found that unitization did increase associa-
tive recognition but not item recognition (which remained
unchanged), arguing against the semantic elaboration account.
Others have argued that the item account predicts decreased
familiarity of the constituent items, because only the unitized
whole and not the constituent elements is readily available to
familiarity at retrieval (Mayes, Montaldi, & Migo, 2007;
Pilgrim, Murray, & Donaldson, 2012). Nevertheless, the sche-
ma account, unlike the semantic elaboration account, is also
consistent with this suggestion of decreased familiarity. This is
because schema theories typically argue that schemas repre-
sent commonalities, and therefore ignore item-specific details
(e.g., Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014). Therefore, changes to item
familiarity alone cannot be used to falsify our proposed sche-
ma account, and this should be tested by other means.
If current evidence is insufficient to distinguish item and
schema accounts of unitization, how can they be tested? We
suggest that a key property of the schema but not item account
is the potential for generalization. In its most basic form, a
schema (S) is an abstract structure that allows two initially
unrelated items (A and B) to become bound together, by virtue
of links between A and S and between B and S. For example,
in the presence of semantic links between Ba garden for sky-
gazing^ (S) and CLOUD (A), and between Ba garden for sky-
gazing^ (S) and LAWN (B), the novel association between
CLOUD and LAWN (A-C) can be easily established. Then, if
the schema (S) is reactivated later by a new pairing ofMOON-
LAWN (D-B), this should also allow rapid learning because
MOON also relates to Ba garden for sky-gazing,^ i.e. the
schema enables generalization to new, related pairings (see
Fig. 1). If the new pairing were however TEA-LAWN, then
the lack of any semantic relationship between TEA and Ba
garden for sky-gazing^ would not allow the schema to facil-
itate learning of TEA-LAWN. This schema account contrasts
with the item account, which predicts that CLOUDLAWN
becomes a new item representation that is not strongly linked
to the original CLOUD and LAWN representations. Because
of this unique (conjunctive) nature, no benefit is predicted for
subsequent learning of the relatedMOON-LAWNpairing (i.e,
learning should be no different from the unrelated TEA-
LAWN pairing).
Note that this schema account is different from the
semantic elaboration account refuted by Parks and
Yonelinas (2015), in that linking a new pair of words
(e.g, CLOUD and LAWN) into an abstract schema (Ba
garden used for sky-gazing^) might entail elaboration of
some aspects of the meanings of these words (e.g., to do
with lying down and observing the sky), but is also likely
to entail reduced elaboration of schema-irrelevant mean-
ings (e.g., impending rain and cutting the grass), relative
for example to the semantic elaboration entailed by the
sentence condition (Bthe cloud could be seen from the
lawn^). Note also that the schema account of generaliza-
tion is more than simply semantic mediation, whereby re-
presentation of LAWN re-activates the previously paired
associate CLOUD, and a pre-existing semantic link be-
tween CLOUD and MOON then allows CLOUD to
Bmediate^ the new association MOON-LAWN. While this
may occur, there is no obvious reason why activation of a
semantic mediator should be more common in a definition
condition than a sentence condition. Rather, we propose
that an abstract structure, such as Ba garden used for sky-
gazing^, is more likely to be generated in the definition
condition than sentence condition, and only this abstract
structure needs to be reactivated in order to facilitate new
learning of MOON-LAWN (i.e, act as a schema), without
necessarily re-activating the original study pair (CLOUD-
LAWN).
We therefore performed three experiments along the
lines above, in order to distinguish the item and schema
accounts of unitization.
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Experiment 1
The basic design of Experiment 1 is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Following Bader et al. (2010) and Quamme et al. (2007), we
operationalized Bunitization^ as the difference between two
words being linked by a definition (e.g., CLOUD/LAWN, A
garden used for sky-gazing), relative to two words being
linked by a sentence (e.g., CLOUD/LAWN, The ______
could be seen from the ______). This manipulation of
encoding instructions was done during an initial study phase.
We crossed these two conditions with the nature of a second
word-pair presented in a subsequent relearning phase, which
was either the same pairing as in initial learning (repeat con-
dition, e.g., CLOUD-LAWN), a related pairing (e.g., MOON-
LAWN) or unrelated pairing (e.g., TEA-LAWN). Then in the
final test phase, participants selected the word from the
relearning phase (i.e., MOON) that had been paired with a
cue word (e.g., LAWN), from one of four alternatives (see
Methods for precise description of foils). We hypothesized
that, if schemas underline unitization, then there should be
some generalization to related ideas, such that there would
be a greater advantage of definition over sentence conditions
for related than for unrelated conditions. We further expected
this effect to be accompanied by increased erroneous selection
of new related rather than unrelated lures (e.g., STAR) in the
definition over sentence conditions. The purpose of the repeat
condition was to check that we replicate the basic advantage
of definition versus sentence conditions (i.e., the unitization
advantage) that has been reported previously.
Methods
Participants Twenty-four Cambridge community members
participated in the experiment (21 females, mean age 27.3
years, SD = 5.77). In Parks and Yonelinas (2015;
Experiment 1), a similar stimulus dataset and a similar
(encoding) task were used in a between-participant design,
with 22 participants in each encoding condition. Based on
the data presented in Fig. 1 of their paper, we estimated M =
0.71, SD = 0.328 in the definition condition, andM = 0.16, SD
= 0.169 in the sentence condition. Cohen’s d was therefore
estimated to be 2.1, which meant that testing six participants
Fig. 1 Schematic depiction of unitization encoding (top) and
generalization (bottom) under an item account (left) and a schema
account (right). Blue coloring indicates items and links that already
exist in the network (we use the term Bexisting links^ to refer to items
that similarly fit with the definition). Red coloring indicates new links and
items that are learned during encoding or generalization. Solid lines
indicate components that are explicitly activated during encoding or
generalization, while dashed lines indicate components in the network
that are not explicitly presented but can be activated indirectly (e.g., via
pre-existing links). Interrupted red lines (item account) represent tempo-
rary links, which only remain active until the Bfused^ representation is
created. Green cloud (schema account) represents a schema that can bind
items together
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should be sufficient in order to obtain statistical power of 95%.
Nevertheless, we had to test at least 24 participants to achieve
a full counterbalance of our experimental design, which ac-
cording to the above calculations would provide a power >
99%.
Two participants were excluded from the study due to very
fast averaged response times in some conditions (< 750 ms,
while minimum averaged RT after excluding these partici-
pants was 1,923 ms). These participants were replaced with
two others, to keep the dataset counterbalanced. For one par-
ticipant, a software crash caused 17 relearning trials to be
repeated, but these trials were later excluded. For all experi-
ments, participants were recruited from the volunteer panel of
the MRC Cognition and Brain Science Unit, were native
English speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
and were never diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), dyslexia, or any other developmental or
learning disabilities. They all provided informed consent and
received monetary compensation for participation, as ap-
proved by a local ethics commit tee (Cambridge
Psychological Research Ethics Committee reference
2005.08).
Materials Initial study materials included 288 entries. Each
entry was comprised of semantically unrelated word pairs
and their corresponding definitions and sentences that were
used in Haskins et al. (2008). For example, one of the entries
in this database included the word-pair CLOUD LAWN,
which corresponded to the definition BA garden used for
sky-gazing^ and to the sentence BThe _____ could be seen
from the ______^. For each entry, we designated one word of
each word-pair to serve as the cue (thus remaining constant
across phases), and the other to serve as its associate. For 50%
of the entries in the database the first word was assigned to be
the cue-word, and for the remaining 50% the secondword was
the cue word. This assignment remained constant across
Fig. 2 Illustration of the experimental design of Experiment 1. Definition
and sentence blocks only differed at study phase. The test trial in the
example corresponds to the related trial in the relearning phase. The
target response (MOON) is highlighted. Other response types are old-
different (TEA), new-related (STAR), and new-unrelated
(LEMONADE). Repetition of word pairs in the figure is for illustrative
purposes: during the task, each word-pair was only presented once under
definition / sentence encoding and once under repeat / related / unrelated
relearning
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experimental lists. We then added to each entry two additional
associates (also unrelated to the cue) that would fit the defini-
tions and the sentences to a similar degree as the original
associate. For example, for the example described above, the
cue word LAWN, which was paired with CLOUD (its original
associate), was also paired with MOON and STAR that fit the
definition and sentence in the same way as the word CLOUD.
In some cases, minor modifications were made to the original
entries (from Haskins et al., 2008) to allow more words to fit
with the definitions/sentences (e.g., for the word pair
COFFEE PERSON, the definition BA vendor of caffeinated
beverages^wasmodified to BAvendor of beverages,^ in order
to also fit TEA and LEMONADE as alternatives to COFFEE).
The full database was divided into 24 sub-lists, with 12 entries
in each sub-list. In each sub-list, each entry was pseudo-
randomly associated with the following entry (the last entry
was associated with the first one), in order to add to this entry
two other words that are unrelated, i.e., do not fit with the
definitions/sentences (e.g., CLOUD was further linked with
TEA and LEMONADE). Thus, each associate (CLOUD) was
linked with two related alternatives (MOON and STAR) and
two unrelated alternatives (TEA and LEMONADE).
The fit of the original associate and its alternatives with the
definitions and sentences were assessed by eight raters (four
for the definitions and four for the sentences) who did not take
part in the main experiments and were all native English
speakers. They were asked to decide if the related words sim-
ilarly fit the definitions/sentences or not, and if the unrelated
words similarly misfit the definitions/sentences. If not, they
were asked to come upwith a suggestion that they think would
be more appropriate. Words marked as unfit (for related
words) or as fit (for unrelated words) by more than one rater
were replaced with the words suggested. These new matches
were verified by two other independent judges.
Design and procedure The experiment was run using E-Prime
2 (Psychology Software Tools). Participants sat in front of a
computer monitor within a comfortable viewing distance. All
verbal stimuli (except for cue-word at test, see below), were
displayed in Courier New 18-point font, in black against a
gray background. Our design included three experimental
phases: study, relearning and test, with an additional
distracting task (counting backwards for 30 s) succeeding
study and relearning phases.
The study phase included two conditions: during the defi-
nition encoding condition, participants were instructed to rate
the pair as a whole on a scale ranging from 1 (Bvery badly^) to
4 (Bverywell^) according to howwell the definition combined
the meanings of the two words into a sensible compound. In
the sentence encoding condition, participants were instructed
to rate how well the two words fitted into the sentence frame.
Study trials began with a 500-ms fixation cross. Next, a word-
pair (e.g., CLOUD LAWN) and a definition/sentence were
displayed for 3,500 ms one above the other, slightly above
and below central vision. Sentence frames were constructed
with two blank spaces, where the first item was intended to fit
into the first space, and the second item into the second space.
This was followed by a 100-ms blank screen, which was then
replaced by a screen displaying a question mark. Participants
were instructed to respond when the question mark appears,
via the keys ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ and ‘4’ on the left side of the key-
board. Response time was self-paced, and triggered the onset
of the next trial.
During the relearning phase, participants were presented
with a word-pair, and were asked to judge which of the two
words is more frequent in their daily life, using the left arrow
to indicate the left word, or the right arrow to indicate the right
word. This phase included three relearning conditions: in the
repeat condition, word-pairs were identical to pairs presented
at study (CLOUD LAWN). In the related condition, cue-
words remained the same, but associates were replaced with
a related alternative (MOON LAWN). In the unrelated condi-
tion, cue-words remained the same, but associates were re-
placed with an unrelated alternative (TEA LAWN). The
relearning task (frequency judgment) remained the same
across these three conditions. Relearning trials began with a
500-ms fixation cross. Next, a word-pair was presented for
3,500 ms, slightly above central vision. As in the study phase,
this was followed by a 100-ms blank screen, which was re-
placed by a response screen displaying a question mark where
participants were asked to provide their responses.
Finally, at the test phase, participants were presented with a
cue word (LAWN) shown in red at the top of the screen. Below
it, four words appeared. One was its paired-associate from the
relearning phase (target, correct response: CLOUD in the re-
peated condition, MOON in the related condition and TEA in
the unrelated condition). The second was a word that was pre-
sented at relearning, but was paired with a different cue (old-
different, e.g., TEA when target is MOON and TEAwas pre-
sented in a different relearning trial). The other two lures were
new words that were not presented before. One was the related
alternative (new-related, e.g., STAR when target is MOON),
and the remaining one was the unrelated alternative (new-un-
related, e.g., LEMONADE when target is MOON and TEA
was presented in a different relearning trial). Participants were
asked to indicate which word was associated with the cue-word
at relearning. Test trials began with a 500-ms fixation cross,
followed by the presentation of the cue-word and four alterna-
tive forced choice (AFC). Participants were asked to press BR^
to select the top-left word, BC^ to select bottom-left, BU^ to
select top-right, and BM^ to select bottom-right. Responses
were self-paced and triggered the appearance of a 100-ms blank
screen, followed by the next trial.
Encoding conditions were presented in different blocks,
with block order (either definition - sentence – sentence –
definition or sentence – definition – definition – sentence)
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counterbalanced across participants. This factor did not inter-
act with any of the experimental conditions, and therefore was
not investigated further. Relearning conditions were random-
ized within and between blocks. Each block included 24
word-pairs in each relearning condition (total of 72 per block).
Overall, the experiment included four blocks, each containing
all three experimental phases.
Results
All statistical analyses were performed using R version 3.4.1
and RStudio Version 1.0153, with packages BayesFactor
(Morey & Rouder, 2015), ez (Lawrence, 2016), and psych
(Revelle, 2017). In addition to classical hypothesis testing,
we also employed Bayesian statistics throughout the entire
study, to allow interpretation of null results. Unlike classical
hypothesis testing, in which the p-value is calculated based on
the assumption of drawing a hypothetical infinite number of
samples (i.e., sampling distribution), the Bayesian approach
makes direct probability statements about the parameters
using the observed sample. Under this approach, a Bayes fac-
tor (BF) is used to quantify the support for one model (e.g., the
alternate hypothesis) over another (e.g., the null model). It is
generally agreed that a model is favored when a Bayes factor
greater than 3 is obtained (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, &
Geoffrey, 2009).
Performance during study To test for differences in related-
ness rating at study, we used a two-sided pairwise t-test and a
Bayesian t-test with a Cauchy prior scaled at sqrt(2)/2 (medi-
um scaling), contrasting averaged rating scores in the defini-
tion versus sentence condition. This revealed a significant
difference, t(23) = -2.93, p = .008, 95%, CI [-.51, -.09];
BF(h1) = 6.17, credential interval (CrI) [-.45, -.1], with
word-pairs in the sentence condition (M = 2.95, SD = 0.5)
being judged as more related than in the definition condition
(M = 5.65, SD = 0.49).
We further conducted a logistic regression analysis, to en-
sure that these differences in relatedness ratings during study
do not interact with accuracy at test. This analysis was set to
predict retrieval outcome in each trial (0 – unsuccessful; 1 –
successful) using relatedness rating at study (1 – 4).
Coefficient values for the predictor were extracted separately
for each participant in each encoding condition. A one-sample
t-test, contrasting the mean value of these coefficients against
zero, separately for each encoding condition, did not reveal
any significant differences for definition encoding, t(23) = .58,
p = .57, CI [-.06, .1], or for sentence encoding: t(23) = -.02, p =
.98, CI [-.09, .09]. Furthermore, Bayesian t-tests showed evi-
dence in favor of the null hypothesis of no difference between
coefficients for definition encoding, BF(h0) = 4, CrI [-.04,
-.07], and for sentence encoding, BF(h0) = 4.66, CrI [-.07,
.07]. These results suggest that the ability to accurately
retrieve pair-associates during the retrieval phase is not pre-
dicted by ratings at study.
Test performance: 4AFC Accuracy rates at test (defined as
% correct responses; chance performance is 25%) in the
various encoding and relearning conditions are shown in
Fig. 3. To check that we replicate the basic unitization
effect, we contrasted accuracy rates at retrieval in the re-
peat condition for definition versus sentence encoding
using a one-sided paired-sample t-test and a Bayesian t-
test. These revealed that memory following definition
encoding was significantly better than following sentence
encoding, t(23) = 2.91, p = .004, CI [.02, .09]; BF(h1) =
11.69, CrI [.02, .08], consistent with the unitization effect.
Next, we tested our hypothesized schema account of
unitization, which we expressed as two predictions.
First, our main prediction was a greater advantage of def-
inition over sentence encoding conditions for related than
for unrelated relearning conditions. To test this prediction,
we used a 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with
encoding condition (definition, sentence) and relearning
condition (related, unrelated) as repeated factors. This
analysis revealed a significant effect of encoding condi-
tion, F(1, 23) = 5.37, p = .029, 2G = .008 (though
stemming mostly from differences in the unrelated
condition; see Fig. 3), with better memory following def-
inition encoding compared to sentence encoding. The ef-
fect of relearning condition, F(1, 23) = 1.18, p = .29, 2G
= .003, and the interaction between the two factors, F(1,
23) = .46, p = .5, 2G < .001, were not significant. In
other words, our main prediction was not confirmed, and
in fact, a numerical trend suggested the opposite pattern
of a greater difference between related than unrelated in
the sentence condition.
In addition, we used a Bayesian analysis to allow in-
terpretation of null effects. For each participant, we cal-
culated the difference in accuracy rates for definition ver-
sus sentence encoding, separately for related and unrelat-
ed relearning. We then used a one-sided Bayesian t-test to
compare two hypotheses: that the difference between
encoding conditions does not differ for related and unre-
la ted relearning condi t ions ( the so-cal led Bnul l
hypothesis^), or that this difference is bigger for related
relearning condition versus unrelated relearning condition.
This analysis supported the null model, with a Bayes fac-
tor of BF(h0) = 7.23, CrI [-.07, .03]. The data thus pro-
vide moderate evidence against the hypothesis that mem-
ory is better for related versus unrelated information fol-
lowing definition but not sentence encoding.
Our second prediction was increased selection of new-
related lures in the definition over sentence encoding con-
ditions for related than for unrelated relearning conditions.
The error data are summarized in Table 1; the proportions of
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new-related distractors are shown in Table 2. These propor-
tions were calculated by dividing the number of new-related
responses by the total number of new responses (new-relat-
ed / [new-related + new-unrelated]). Three participants who
did not provide any new responses (thereby resulting in a
zero denominator) were removed from this analysis. These
proportions were subjected to a 2 X 2 ANOVA analysis with
encoding condition and relearning condition (related, unre-
lated) as repeated factors, which revealed a significant effect
of relearning condition, with increased selection of new-
related distractors in the related condition, F(1, 20) =
11.48, p = .003, 2G = .13. The effect of encoding condition,
F(1, 20) = .08, p = .77, 2G < .001, and the encoding-by-
relearning interaction, F(1, 20) = .29, p = .6, 2G = .002,
were not significant. A Bayesian t-test for the difference
between definition and sentence encoding in proportion of
new-related distractors for related versus unrelated
relearning, revealed anecdotal evidence in support of the
null hypothesis, BF(h0) = 2.79, CrI [-.08 .15].
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 do not support a schema account,
because unitized associations did not generalize to learning of
new related information. We did not find any greater advan-
tage of definit ion versus sentence encoding (our
operationalization of unitization) when learning new related
information than when learning new unrelated information,
neither in accuracy rates nor in the tendency to erroneously
select related lures. This is despite the fact that we did see an
advantage of definition versus sentence encoding in the repeat
condition, supporting the previously reported unitization
effect.
It is possible, however, that unitized associations do gener-
alize to accommodate new information, but only under certain
conditions. One factor that might promote such generalization
is the extent to which unitized information is perceived as
generalizable. That is, if the same cue were associated at
encoding with multiple related associates, indicating a more
Fig. 3 Experiment 1: Proportion of correct responses at test, in the
various encoding and relearning conditions. The two leftmost bars
represent accuracy in the repeat (control) condition. Performance for re-
peated trials was significantly better for the definition than sentence con-
ditions, consistent with the basic unitisation effect (***p < .005). The four
bars on the right represent accuracy in the related and unrelated condi-
tions. The predicted interaction between study condition and relearning
condition was not significant (n.s). Error bars represent SEs for each
condition separately
Table 1 Error data for Experiment 1. Data represent % of errors made to each lure type. Standard deviations are given in parentheses
Repeat Related Unrelated
Old- New- New- Old- New- New- Old- New- New-
Different Related Unrelated Different Related Unrelated Different Related Unrelated
Definition 52.4 (19.7) 29.4 (21.2) 18.2 (13.9) 60.7 (15.3) 24.9 (10.6) 14.4 (9.7) 66.0 (13.7) 15.6 (11.0) 18.4 (7.9)
Sentence 61.4 (20.6) 21.7 (14.5) 16.9 (12.8) 60.5 (17.6) 21.3 (9.4) 18.2 (11.9) 59.6 (16.4) 20.0 (9.1) 20.4 (11.0)
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general relationship (schema), would this encourage further
generalization during relearning? Experiment 2 addressed this
possibility.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we added a second study round, in which
each learned cue (e.g., the cue LAWN, which was initially
studied with the target CLOUD) was presented again with
the same definition/sentence, but with a different associate
(e.g., PLANET) that similarly fit the definition/sentence. We
hypothesized that, if the second study round indicates gener-
alizability of the unitized association, then we would expect
further generalization to related ideas. As in Experiment 1, we
tested this prediction of the schema account in terms of the
interaction between encoding condition and relearning condi-
tion, i.e., the prediction of a greater advantage of definition
over sentence conditions for related than for unrelated condi-
tions, and increased erroneous selection of new-related lures
in the definition over sentence conditions for related than for
unrelated conditions. Because of the additional study phase in
each block, and in order to keep total experimental time sim-
ilar to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 dropped the repeat
(control) condition of Experiment 1.
Methods
Participants Sixteen Cambridge community members partici-
pated in the experiment (11 females, mean age 27.56 years,
SD = 7.11).
Materials Study materials included the same stimuli database
used for Experiment 1. However, in order to add an additional
study trial to indicate generalization, we added another asso-
ciate to each of the 288 entries, which would fit the definitions
and the sentences to a similar degree as the other related as-
sociates. For example, the entry containing CLOUD LAWN
was also paired with PLANET that fit the definition and sen-
tence in a similar way to the word MOON LAWN. The fit of
the new alternatives with the definitions and sentences was
assessed by two independent judges who did not take part in
the main experiments. Words marked as unfit were replaced
and verified by the same two judges.
The new experimental design, which required two study
rounds, meant that each block would take longer to complete
compared to Experiment 1. Therefore, in order to keep total
length roughly the same as Experiment 1, Experiment 2 did
not include the repeat conditions (see design below) and stim-
uli database included 196 entries, randomly selected from the
full 288-entries database.
Design and procedure The experimental design was similar to
Experiment 1. Study phase included the same two encoding
conditions (definition and sentence encoding), and relearning
phase included the related and the unrelated relearning
conditions.
The procedure followed that of Experiment 1, except for
one modification: in each block the initial study phase was
followed by a generalization phase, in which study trials were
repeated but with cue-words now paired with the new alterna-
tives (see Materials section above). Participants were not in-
formed when the generalization phase started. They were in-
formed, however, that the pairs will be repeated with some
modifications, but were asked to focus on rating the fit for the
pair as it currently appears. Procedures for relearning and test
phase were identical to Experiment 1.
Encoding conditions were presented in different blocks,
with block order counter-balanced across participants.
Unlike in Experiment 1, however, in Experiment 2 this factor
did interact with some of the experimental conditions, and was
therefore included as a covariate factor in the ANOVAs for the
test phase. Relearning conditions were randomized within
blocks. Each block included 24 word-pairs in each relearning
condition (total of 48 per block). Overall, the experiment in-
cluded four blocks, each containing all four experimental
phases (study, generalization, relearning, and test).
Results
Performance during study A pairwise t-test and a Bayesian t-
test, contrasting averaged rating scores in the definition versus
sentence condition, revealed a significant difference, t(23) = -
6.65, p < .001, CI [-.79, -.41]; BF(h1) = 2782.39, CrI [-.73,
-.4] with word-pairs in the sentence condition (M = 3.13, SD =
0.44) being judged as more related than in the definition con-
dition (M = 2.53, SD = 0.53). We used the same procedure
described for Experiment 1 above, to ensure that these differ-
ences in relatedness ratings during study did not interact with
successful retrieval. Once again, one-sample t-tests and
Bayesian t-tests contrasting Beta values against zero did not
reveal significant differences, neither for definition encoding,
t(15) = 1.46, p = .17, CI [-.05, .26], nor for sentence encoding,
t(15) = -1.02, p = .32, CI [-.34, .12], and the Bayesian t-test
showed anecdotal evidence in favor of the null hypothesis for
both definitions, BF(h0) = 1.61, CrI [-.02, .2], and sentence
encoding, BF(h0) = 2.49, CrI [ -.26, .07].
Table 2 Proportion of new-related distractors in Experiment 1, for n=21
participants, calculated by dividing the number of new-related responses
by overall number of new responses
Repeat Related Unrelated
Definition 57.8 (24.9) 61.4 (21.8) 44.3 (23.3)
Sentence 55.6 (23.9) 60.5 (18.2) 47.4 (15.5)
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Test performance: 4AFC Accuracy rates at test are shown in
Fig. 4. To test the predictions of the schema account, we used
the same analyses performed for Experiment 1, but also in-
cluded block order as a between-subject covariate factor. For
the first prediction, the 2 X 2 repeated measures ANCOVA
with encoding and relearning conditions as repeated factors,
and with block order as covariate, did not reveal any signifi-
cant results: F(1, 15) = .6, p = .45, 2G = .004 for encoding
condition; F(1, 15) = 3.79, p = .07, 2G = .017 for relearning
condition; F(1, 15) = .54, p = .47, 2G = .002 for the interac-
tion. The lack of interaction between encoding and relearning
conditions was further supported by our Bayesian comparison
of the null against the alternate hypothesis, revealing prefer-
ence for the null hypothesis of no advantage for definition
over sentences for related versus unrelated relearning,
BF(h0) = 6.18, CrI [-.08, .04]. Thus, there was no evidence
of greater advantage of definition over sentence encoding for
related than for unrelated relearning condition
The error data are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. For our
second prediction, the 2 X 2 ANCOVA for the proportion of
new-related distractors, with encoding and relearning condi-
tions as repeated factors, and with block order as covariate,
revealed a significant effect of relearning condition, with in-
creased selection of new-related distractors in the related con-
dition, F(1, 15) = 22.2, p < .001, 2G = .14 but no effect of
encoding condition, F(1, 15) =.1, p = .76, 2G = .003.
Additionally, a significant interaction between encoding and
relearning condition emerged, F(1, 15) = 6.07, p = .026, 2G =
.05. Nevertheless, one-sided t-tests, performed separately for
definition and sentence encoding, revealed that this interaction
stemmed from increased selection of new-related distractors
in the related versus unrelated relearning condition for items in
the sentence encoding condition, t(15) = 4.07, p = .001, CI
[.15, .39], but not in the definition encoding condition, t(15) =
1.89, p = .08, CI [-.01, .14], and therefore was in the opposite
direction to our prediction. This was supported by our
Bayesian analysis, which showed strong evidence in favor
of the null hypothesis, BF(h0) = 11.12, CrI [-.03, .04], over
the alternate hypothesis of greater difference between
encoding conditions in the related than the unrelated
relearning condition.
To summarize, definition encoding was not associated with
better learning of related words, nor with increased selection
of related new lures at test. Our hypothesis that, following
generalized encoding, unitized associations would form a
schema into which new information can be easily integrated,
was not confirmed by Experiment 2 either.
Discussion
As with Experiment 1, the results of Experiments 2 supported
the null hypothesis, suggesting that unitized associations do
not generalize to facilitate learning of new, related
information. This is even though Experiment 2 included an
additional study phase, which was intended to indicate to par-
ticipants that the learned information was generalizable.
However, in Experiments 1 and 2, the relearning phase in-
volved a frequency judgment task, which can be accom-
plished without referring to the information that was learned
during study. It is possible that in order for unitized associa-
tions to generalize, they need to be activated when new infor-
mation is learned. In our final attempt to promote generaliza-
tion, we designed a task in which the associated information
from the study phase was explicitly re-activated during
relearning.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, participants completed a memory task during
the relearning phase, in which they were asked to identify old
and new pairings (i.e., whether or not from the study phase),
thereby activating memories from the study phase during the
relearning phase. If re-activation promotes generalization of
unitized associations, then we have the same predictions as in
Experiments 1 and 2, i.e., greater accuracy rates at test, as well
as increased erroneous selection of new-related lures, for def-
inition over sentence encoding when related versus unrelated
information is presented at relearning.
The inclusion of a memory task at relearning also allowed
us to inquire whether there was an indication for generaliza-
tion in this phase too. We predicted that if generalization oc-
curs during relearning, then the definition encoding would
increase the number of erroneous responses relative to sen-
tence encoding, in which participants were more likely to
classify newly learned associations as Bold^ for related than
for unrelated pairs.
Finally, as in Experiment 1, we included a repeat condition
as a control, to check that definition versus sentence encoding
produced the same advantage associated with unitization.
Moreover, we expected this advantage to emerge during
relearning as well as the test phase.
Methods
Participants Twenty-four Cambridge community members
participated in the experiment (20 females, mean age 23.96
years, SD = 5.77).
Design and procedureMaterials and design were the same as
in Experiment 1: the study phase included two conditions
(definition and sentence encoding); the re-learning phase in-
cluded three conditions (repeat, related, and unrelated); and
the test phase included a 4AFC retrieval task. Block order in
this experiment did not interact with experimental conditions,
and was not investigated further.
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During the relearning phase, participants had to complete a
task different from the other two experiments. They were told
that they will see word pairs, and were asked to indicate which
they saw before in the study phase. They were asked to press a
key with their index finger if they only saw the left word in the
previous phase (an old-new pair), with their ring finger if they
only saw the right word (a new-old pair), and with their mid-
dle finger if they saw both words together (old pairing).
Because for half the pairs the first word was assigned to be
the cue-word (which remained fixed), and for the other half
the second word was the cue word (see Materials section for
Experiment 1), repeated pairs were to receive old-pairing re-
sponses, while related and unrelated pairs were to receive
either old-new or new-old responses. Participants were further
instructed that to aid their memory, they should try to bring to
mind the definitions or sentences from the previous phase.
Results
Performance during study As with the other experiments, a
pairwise t-test and a Bayesian t-test revealed a significant
difference, t(24) = -6.45, p < .001, CI [-.65, -.33]; BF(h1) =
13246.91, CrI [-.61, -.34], with word-pairs in the sentence
condition (M = 3.18, SD = .32) being judged as more related
than in the definition condition (M = 2.68, SD = .46). Once
again, one-sample t-tests and Bayesian t-tests contrasting Beta
values against zero did not reveal significant differences be-
tween successful and unsuccessful retrieval trials in their re-
latedness ratings at study, for neither definition encoding,
t(23) = .9, p = .37, CI [-.06, .17]; BF(h0) = 3.22, CrI [-.04,
.13], nor for sentence encoding t(23) = 1.79, p = .09, CI [-.02,
.25]; BF(h0) = 1.18, CrI [.002, .2].
Performance during relearningWe replicated once again the
basic unitization effect, this time during the relearning
phase: we contrasted accuracy rates at relearning following
definition versus sentence encoding in the repeat condition
using a one-sided paired-sample t-test and a Bayesian t-test.
This revealed that definition (M = 82, SD = .11) encoding
resulted in significantly better memory than sentence
encoding (M = 75, SD = .12), t(23) = 3.73, p < .001, CI
[.04, .11]; BF(h1) = 64.6, CrI [.03, .1].
Fig. 4 Experiment 2: Proportion of correct responses at test, in the
various encoding and relearning conditions. Bars represent accuracy in
the related and unrelated conditions. The predicted interaction between
study condition and relearning condition was not significant (n.s.). Error
bars represent SEs for each condition separately
Table 3 Error data for Experiment 2. Data represent % of errors that made to each lure type. Standard deviations are given in parentheses
Condition Related Unrelated
Old- New- New- Old- New- New-
Different Related Unrelated Different Related Unrelated
Definition 55.5 (15.4) 30.4 (15.4) 14.1 (9.1) 61.7 (16.3) 21.7 (10.9) 16.7 (9.1)
Sentence 66.0 (15.3) 23.6 (10.6) 10.4 (7.8) 62.9 (16.4) 17.7 (9.3) 19.4 (10.2)
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We further tested our prediction that a schema account
would be indicated by greater number of erroneous Bold^
responses to new pairs in definition over sentence encoding
for related than for unrelated relearning. A 2 X 2 repeated
measures ANOVA and the corresponding Bayesian analysis,
revealed a significant effect of relearning condition, F(1, 23) =
55.75, p < .001, 2G = .22, but no significant effect of encoding
condition, F(1, 23) = 1.42, p = .25, 2G = .008, and no inter-
action between the two factors, F(1, 23) = 2.04, p = .17, 2G =
.006; BF(h0) = 10.23, CrI [-.04, .004].
Performance at test: 4AFCAccuracy rates are shown in Fig. 5.
Like in Experiment 1, we replicated the basic unitization effect
at test, with increased accuracy rates following definition ver-
sus sentence encoding in the repeat condition, t(23) = 2.91, p =
.004, CI [.02, 0.8]; BF(h1) = 11.7, CrI [.02, .07]. A 2 X 2
repeated measures ANOVA, set to test for greater advantage
of definition over sentence encoding for related than for unre-
lated relearning, revealed a significant main effect of
relearning condition, F(1, 23) = 180.26, p < .001, 2G = .17,
but nomain effect for encoding condition, F(1, 23) = 3.43, p =
.08, 2G = .01, and no interaction, F(1, 23) = .03, p = .87, 2G <
.001. This lack of interaction was further supported by our
Bayesian analysis, confirming support for the null hypothesis
of no difference, BF(h0) = 5.24, CI [-.06, .05].
The error data are summarized in Tables 5 and 6. To test our
prediction of increased selection of new-related lures in the
definition over sentence encoding for related than for unrelat-
ed relearning, we excluded seven participants who did not
provide any responses of these response types. The 2 X 2
ANOVA for the proportion of new-related distractors revealed
a significant effect of relearning condition, with increased se-
lection of new-related distractors in the related condition, F(1,
16) = 9.82, p = .006, 2G = .08, but no effect of encoding
condition, F(1, 16) = 4.04, p = .06, 2G = .06, and no interac-
tion between these factors, F(1, 16) = 1.13, p = .3, 2G = .02.
Despite the numerical trend in the predicted direction, the lack
of interaction was somewhat confirmed by the Bayesian anal-
ysis, which showed anecdotal evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis, BF(h0) = 1.48, CrI [-.06, .21].
Discussion
As in the previous experiments, the data from Experiment 3
show that unitized associations do not generalize to facilitate
learning of new related information. An additional effect that
emerged in this experiment is a main effect of relearning con-
dition, with better memory following related versus unrelated
relearning. This effect is likely due to the nature of the
relearning task, in which participants are encouraged to bring
to mind the definitions and sentences from the study phase
when performing a memory judgment during relearning.
Noticeably, such reference would be useful for memory judg-
ments in repeated and related trials, where the information
during relearning relates to that during study. This would fa-
cilitate information processing at relearning, and subsequently
promote memory for these trials at test. Nevertheless, because
this effect was equally strong for definition and sentence
encoding, it does not entail any new insights regarding
unitization.
Post-hoc analyses
Before turning to the General discussion, we describe a set of
additional post-hoc analyses, meant to ensure that the null
effect obtained in this study is indeed reliable. The first anal-
ysis was conducted to account for the fact that Bayes factors
are sensitive to sample size. Because the structure of the three
experiments was similar, we pooled the data from all three
experiments (n = 64) to increase statistical power. As before,
we took the difference in accuracy rates for definition versus
sentence encoding, separately for related and unrelated
relearning (see above), and used a one-sided Bayesian t-test
with a Cauchy prior scaled at medium scaling, to compare the
null hypothesis that the difference between encoding condi-
tions does not differ for related and unrelated relearning, with
the alternate hypothesis that this difference is bigger for relat-
ed versus unrelated relearning. This analysis provided strong
support for the null hypothesis over the alternate schema ac-
count, BF(h0) = 12.84, CrI [-.05 .02].
The second post-hoc analysis followed the notion that even
a meta-analysis which combines only few results can give a
valuable increase in precision (Cumming, Fidler, Kalinowski,
& Lai, 2012). To estimate the pooled effect size of the
Encoding X Relearning interaction across the three experi-
ments, we calculated means and standard errors for the two
difference measures (difference between definition and sen-
tence encoding for related relearning; difference between def-
inition and sentence encoding for unrelated relearning), and
performed a Bayesian meta-analysis using the bmeta R pack-
age (Ding & Baio, 2016), which uses Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC). In our implementation, the mean difference
was the outcome measure, and the data were defined as con-
tinuous, two armed data. As shown in Fig. 6, the overall
pooled μ was -0.016 (95% CrI [-0.14 0.111]), indicating that
across all studies there was no indication for greater advantage
of definition over sentence encoding conditions for related
than for unrelated relearning conditions.
Table 4 Proportion of new-related distractors in Experiment 2
Related Unrelated
Definition 66.0 (25.1) 58.8 (22.8)
Sentence 73.6 (18.3) 46.6 (18.0)
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The aim of the third post-hoc analysis was to ensure that
the study was sufficiently powered to detect potential ef-
fects. To this end, we calculated the observed power with
the pwr R package (Champely, 2017) for the unitization
effect obtained from Experiments 1 and 3 (n=48;
Experiment 2 did not include the repeat conditions). This
analysis revealed that the observed power was .99904, sug-
gesting that the current study is very well powered for the
detection of the unitization effect. Although this effect
would arguably be the upper boundary of any generalization
effects, the robustness of the unitization effect, coupled with
a strong Bayesian preference of the null hypothesis, rein-
force that the observed null effect is reliable.
The final post-hoc analysis aimed to rule out an alternative
explanation – that this null effect is related to linguistic fea-
tures of the to-be-learned compounds; more specifically, to
their semantic transparency. Open compounds (i.e., com-
pounds that are written as separate words) can differ in their
level of transparency or opacity. Some compounds are fully
transparent. In such compounds, themeaningof both constit-
uents is transparently related to themeaningof the compound
asawhole. InSCHOOLBUS,forexample, themeaningof the
compoundwordisrelatedtothemeaningofbothconstituents,
as school bus is a vehicle (bus) that drives children to an edu-
cational institution (school). Turning to an example from the
current study, under the definition of Ba garden for sky-
gazing^, the compoundCLOUDLAWN is fully transparent,
as this a garden (lawn) from which one can gaze at the sky
(clouds). Incontrast, a compound likeBcottagepie^ is partial-
ly opaque, because, although it has todowithpie, it has less to
do with cottage (semantically, rather than historically).
Transparency level of the unitized compound might interact
with its ability to generalize to facilitate new learning.
Specifically, it could be that generalization is only possible
when constituents are transparent, and therefore newly
learned information can be linked back to the original
Fig. 5 Experiment 3: Proportion of correct responses at test, in the
various encoding and relearning conditions. The two left-most bars rep-
resent accuracy in the repeat (control) condition. Performance for repeat-
ed trials was significantly better for the definition than sentence condi-
tions, consistent with the basic unitisation effect. The four bars on the
right represent accuracy in the related and unrelated conditions (***p <
.005). The predicted interaction between study condition and relearning
condition was not significant (n.s). Error bars represent SEs for each
condition separately
Table 5 Error data for Experiment 3. Data represent % of errors that made to each lure type. For each response type in each condition, mean and
standard deviations are only calculated for participants who generated at least one erroneous response of this type
Repeat Related Unrelated
Old- New- New- Old- New- New- Old- New- New-
Different Related Unrelated Different Related Unrelated Different Related Unrelated
Definition 41.5 (32.8) 38.5 (28.9) 20.0 (21.5) 44.1 (14.9) 41.9 (15.3) 14.0 (10.4) 49.6 (13.6) 30.7 (12.1) 19.7 (8.9)
Sentence 38.7 (27.3) 38.4 (25.3) 22.9 (25.6) 43.5 (13.2) 34.3 (12.8) 22.2 (8.3) 52.2 (16.3) 25.3 (13.9) 22.5 (9.6)
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meaning of the constituents. In the present study, in order to
enable rapidprocessingof compounds that are learnedwithin
the context of single-trial learning, we used a stimulus data-
base in which most compounds are fully transparent.
Nevertheless, when validating the dataset we did not control
for this property of the compounds. The inclusion of opaque
compoundsmighthavecompromisedourability toobtain the
predictedgeneralizationeffect.Toruleout thispotentialalter-
native account, an individual (who did not participate in any
experiment) reviewed the database, and marked all com-
pounds that were not fully transparent. This resulted in 11
stimulimarkedaspartially transparent.All other stimuliwere
marked as fully transparent. We then excluded these entries
from the dataset, pooled the data from all experiments (but
only included trials where stimuli were fully transparent),
and ran the same analysis which was used for our first post-
hocanalysis.Onceagain,theanalysisprovidedstrongsupport
for the null hypothesis over the alternate schema account,
BF(h0) = 13.12, CrI [-.08 .03], suggesting that evenwhen all
the pairs are fully transparent, generalization does not occur.
General discussion
In three experiments, we tested an alternative account of unit-
ization. We proposed that rather than fusing two items togeth-
er to form a single unit (the traditional item account), unitiza-
tion rapidly incorporates the items into a schema (the schema
account). We employed a three-stage paradigm, in which unit-
ized and non-unitized associations were learned in an initial
study phase, re-paired with either related or unrelated infor-
mation in a subsequent relearning phase, and retrieved in a
final test phase. More specifically, we used definition versus
sentence encoding during study to define unitization, and
compared memory for related versus unrelated words present-
ed in the relearning phase. If schemas enable generalization,
then we predicted a greater advantage for related than unrelat-
ed words after definition encoding than after sentence
encoding. After failing to find evidence for this interaction
in Experiment 1, we conducted two further experiments to
try to increase the chance of participants using schemas. In
Experiment 2, the to-be-learned association was repeated
twice at study with a different constituent to help indicate that
it is generalizable, while in Experiment 3, we explicitly re-
activated the information used at study during the relearning
phase. Neither manipulation confirmed our prediction, and
Bayes Factors favored the null hypothesis of no generaliza-
tion. Thus, we found no evidence for the schema account of
unitization, and conclude that the item account remains the
most likely account to date.
Fig. 6 Forest plot showing study-specific estimates of the mean differ-
ence for Experiments 1–3 (squares) and the pooled mean difference (di-
amond). On the x-axis, positive numbers indicate that an outcome favors
the related condition (i.e., greater difference between definition and
sentence encoding for related than for unrelated relearning), as predicted
by the schema hypothesis, while negative numbers indicate an outcome
that favors the unrelated condition. In the current case, the outcome was
approximately 0, supporting the null hypothesis
Table 6 Proportion of new-related distractors in Experiment 3, for n=17
participants
Repeat Related Unrelated
Definition 65.8 (29.9) 72.5 (19.3) 57.5 (16.4)
Sentence 66.1 (29.2) 59.2 (15.4) 53.2 (20.4)
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We proposed that when a definition is presented at study, it
establishes a schema. For example, even though a BCOULD
LAWN^ was unlikely to be a concept already possessed by
our participants, we hypothesized that defining it as Ba garden
used for sky-gazing^ would provide a new structure that can
accommodate both words, and subsequently would allow rap-
id one-shot learning of new, related associates. Is it possible
that generalization of unitized associations does occur, but
only when well-established, pre-existing schemas are in-
volved? Some conceptualizations of schemas argue that they
are only developed over time after repeated presentations,
through extraction of commonalities across events (e.g.,
Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014). Furthermore, the acquisition of a
schema, according to this definition, is believed to depend
on systems consolidation (e.g., Tse et al., 2007), which would
take longer than entailed by the current single-session study.
Under these restrictions that schemas require multiple repeti-
tions and/or consolidation, they would be unable to ever ex-
plain unitization effects, since these occur under single-trial,
same-day learning. In the current study, we used a modified
definition of schema, based on the SLIMM model (van
Kesteren et al., 2012). In this framework, the term Bschema^
refers to a cognitive construct with a specific structure (a net-
work of interconnected and activated representations) and
function (affecting online information processing, including
the acquisition of new knowledge). We provide evidence that
such construct (whether termed Bschema^ or otherwise re-
ferred to as Bscript^ or Bgist^) does not underlie unitization.
If abstract structures like schemas can be established quick-
ly, into which related concepts can be assimilated, then it is
possible that they were generated in our sentence condition
too (but simply less effectively than in our definition condi-
tion, given that memory was better after definition than sen-
tence encoding in the repeat condition). If schemas were
established that allow generalization in both encoding condi-
tions, then this might explain why there was minimal interac-
tion between the encoding conditions and related versus un-
related relearning. However, if schemas allow generalization,
then we would expect a main effect of relearning condition,
with better memory for related than unrelated words under
both encoding conditions. This main effect was seen in
Experiment 3, but not in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, any
evidence for generalization – the defining feature that distin-
guishes the schema account of unitization from the item ac-
count – remains limited.
Another possibility that should be considered is that the
generalization effect was not obtained because the tasks that
were used during the relearning phase were not sufficient to
impact performance at the test phase. Indeed, in Experiments
1 and 2, participants were not explicitly instructed to remem-
ber the items during the relearning phase, and thus encoding
may have been incidental. Nevertheless, we believe that sub-
stantial learning did occur during this phase for two reasons.
First, although participants were not instructed to remember
the stimuli during relearning, they knew that a test phase
would follow, in which they would have to retrieve this infor-
mation. This is because theywere informed about the structure
of the task, and also completed a practice block which includ-
ed all three phases. Second, because the target stimuli in the
unrelated conditions were semantically unrelated to the stim-
uli from the initial study phase, above-chance accuracy rates
in this condition can only reflect learning that occurred during
the relearning phase. The fact that accuracy rates in these
conditions were well above chance in all experiments indi-
cates that substantial learning did occur during the relearning
phase.
Although we did not find any evidence to support a schema
account of unitization, the converse may nevertheless be the
case, i.e., that some of the schema effects reported in the lit-
erature actually reflect unitization. For example, in a study
aiming to identify the neural correlates of schema-dependent
encoding, van Kesteren, Beul, Takashima, Henson, Ruiter and
Fernández (2013) presented scene-item pairs at varying con-
gruency levels; more recently, Liu, Grady, and Moscovitch
(2016) showed participants houses that were paired with faces
of either famous or non-famous people, to examine effects of
prior knowledge (as a simplified form of schema) on memory
encoding; Packard, Rodríguez-Fornells, Bunzeck, Nicolás, de
Diego-Balaguer and Fuentemilla (2017; Experiment 4) used
category cues paired with either a congruent or incongruent
target word to examine the temporal dynamics of schema
effects on memory. In all of these examples, the two encoded
items may have been bound together into a single item, and
more easily so in the congruent than the incongruent condi-
tions, and therefore the results of these studies can potentially/
partially be explained by unitization. Future research investi-
gating schema effects on memory can benefit from our current
study by more carefully examining the properties of the
learned associations: if they generalize to accommodate new
information, than they most likely reflect a schema rather than
a unit.
Although the definition/sentence procedure used here is a
common unitization manipulation, other unitization manipu-
lations have been used in previous studies. Unitization can be
achieved by two broad categories of experimental manipula-
tions, driven by either top-down or bottom-up cognitive pro-
cesses (Tibon et al., 2014). Top-down unitization, which was
the focus of the current investigation, is driven purely by in-
structions to process pairs of unrelated memoranda as a single
unit (in high unitization conditions) or as separate elements of
the same episode (in low unitization conditions). Bottom-up
unitization leverages pre-existing semantic and/or perceptual
relations between to-be-associated memoranda. Especially
relevant to a schema account are bottom-upmanipulations that
rely on pre-existing semantic links between the encoded
items. For example, existing word compounds such as
Mem Cogn
Bcottage pie^ are already unitized prior to an experiment, and
are therefore more likely to be perceived as a unit during the
experiment than new word pairs (e.g., Giovanello, Keane, &
Verfaellie, 2006; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007; and see also
Tibon et al, 2014 for similar results with visual stimuli).
Arguably, in such cases, a schema account might be more
applicable than in the case of top-down unitization. Namely,
it is possible that when bottom-up unitization is employed,
reinforcing existing links would be a more efficient process
than fusing items together to create a new representation. To
the extent that different mechanisms support unitization under
different circumstances, unitization might be more likely to
act as a schema in bottom-up situations. Nevertheless, our
current data speak only to top-down unitization, so this would
be an interesting prediction to investigate in future studies.
Additional consideration should be given to other top-
down unitization manipulations. These include viewing or
imagining two stimuli as interacting versus independent
(D’Angelo et al., 2017; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2008), or
encoding source and item information in an internal ver-
sus external manner, thus forming intra- versus inter-item
associations (e.g., Bimagine the item in the color indicated
by the background screen color^ in the unitization condi-
tion, versus Bimagine why the item would be associated
with a stop sign or dollar bill^ in the non-unitization con-
dition; Bastin et al., 2013; Diana et al., 2011). It is possi-
ble that our claim to rule out a schema account is limited
to the manipulation employed in the current study, and it
may not apply to other top-down manipulations.
Nonetheless, we think the definition manipulation is the
one that is most likely to produce a schema, because it
explicitly entails the activation of an abstract concept. For
other top-down manipulations, such as visualizing an item
in a color indicated by the frame, a direct link can be
established between the two stimuli (in this case, an item
and a color), making a schema account less likely.
In summary, Bayesian analysis of the data in the current
study provides strong evidence against a key prediction of the
schema account of unitization, namely that schema should
generalize to related information. While the default item ac-
count therefore remains a likely explanation, alternative ex-
planations of unitization should be considered in future stud-
ies. In particular, studies need to go beyond the finding that
unitized associations can be retrieved via familiarity, by also
verifying other item-like properties that are enabled by
unitization.
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